My first impression was that Tabataba’i would fit well the Kalam school of thought, as he sees philosophy as ”an essential toolkit for the informed believer in the modern world … that would equip her for the intellectual challenges thrown up by the real threats of faith”. Furthermore, he classifies the role of a Muslim philosopher as one that confronts materialism and doubts about Islam. He is also against communism and secularism. But because Tabataba’i is a Shia cleric, and as the Kalam school is a Sunni tradition, he is probably part of a different tradition. However, the similarities remain.
He differs from the Kalam school in the other definitions of philosophy that he brings forward: the metaphysical and social definition. Also, in his conversation with Cobin he declared that there are only ‘philosophical concepts’ and no inherent differences between religions and traditions, they only take different shape in the scriptures to fit the context.
His division of mental and real existence is straightforward and coherent. Although, in his first proof he argues that quiddity is indifferent to existence and it stands at equal relations to existence and non-existence. But when you observe an existent that indifference is broken, but not intrinsically. This explanation was confusing for me. Because when he says that quiddity stands at equal relations to existence and non-existence it seems that it is prior to existence, which is in constrast with his conclusion. A more logical argument could be that quiddities have to be derived from a existent. There must be a existent thing with some qualities in order to mentally conceptualize it. If there are no trees, it is neither possible to conceptualize a tree. If Trump wouldn’t be alive, there would not be conceptualizations of his quiddities.
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